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University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
Freedom of expression is considered a basic human right, and yet most countries have 
restrictions on speech they deem harmful. Following the genocide of the Tutsi, Rwanda passed a 
constitution (2003) and laws against hate speech and other forms of divisionist language (2008, 
2013). Understanding how language shaped “recognition harms” that both constitute and fuel 
genocide also helps account for political decisions to limit “divisionist” discourse. When we 
speak, we make expressive commitments, which are commitments to the viability and value of 
ways of speaking. This article explores reasons a society would decide to say, “We don’t talk 
that way around here,” thus taking control of its own expressive commitments. Understanding 
the scope of the law in Rwanda promises to help clarify limits to hate speech and other forms of 
derogatory discourse (including images). Ultimately, the argument is that wherever recognition 
harms are a significant factor in social and political life, changing permissible expressive 
commitments is crucial to social and political repair. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Words can be like tiny doses of arsenic: they are swallowed unnoticed, appear to have no effect, and then 
after a little while the toxic reaction sets in after all.  
—Victor Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich 
 
Words and images are how people are placed in hierarchies, how social stratification is made to seem 
inevitable and right, how feelings of inferiority and superiority are engendered, and how indifference to 
violence against those on the bottom is rationalized and normalized. Social supremacy is made, inside and 
between people, through making meanings. To unmake it, these meanings and their technologies have to 
be unmade. 
—Catharine MacKinnon, Only Words 
 
Then, in April 1994, came the genocide. What could the media have done? The media are not there to 
fight, but to set things right, to provide accurate information. Instead, there was much propaganda and 
people received messages of hate. You simply cannot imagine it. . . . I have a daughter. She’s twelve now 
but she was very small at the time. One day, somebody said, “That one is a snake. They have to kill her.” 
She wasn’t even two years old. My daughter asked me, “Am I a snake? Am I a snake?” Is that the role of 
the press? Is it the role of the media to harm people? 
—Thomas Kamilindi, “Journalism in a Time of Hate Media” 
 
It is commonly held that hate speech fueled the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda. In Rwanda 
today, concern over derogatory and divisive language has led to measures restricting public 
speech that can be taken to promote genocide ideology, minimization of genocide, and 
divisionism. Such “divisionist” speech is broadly political, in the sense that it shapes the political  
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climate and influences social norms. Sometimes it is narrowly political, as when the ruling Hutu 
party in the early 1990s identified its constituency as Hutu only or when Victoire Ingabire, in 
2010, representing the United Democratic Forces (FDU) party, spoke at the capital city’s 
genocide memorial urging that the Hutu who are sad about their family killed in the genocide 
should be remembered at the genocide memorial alongside the hundreds of thousands of Tutsi 
who are buried there. This is not hate speech, but it is branded as divisive, minimizing the 
genocide, and punished under Rwandan law. 
When a society has been in the grip of harmful ideological practices, and these are embodied 
within its discursive practices, reconciliation requires changes in what people say to and about 
each other. Rwanda has been trying to make such changes, through laws, agencies promoting 
genocide remembrance, countless grassroots reconciliation efforts, civic education through the 
Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace, for example, and more. People all across the 
country know that it is not permissible to call Tutsi ‘inyenzi’ (cockroach) or call for their 
extermination. But the underlying divisions within a society divided by cataclysmic trauma will 
not be solved by eliminating a few derogatory terms. The Parliament has enacted a new 
antidivisionism law, which outlines broader prohibitions aimed at changing norms in how people 
speak and ultimately how they think and behave. Rwanda’s postgenocidal linguistic changes 
should be seen as an explicit effort to foster social unity in response to the severe divisions 
deepened by anti-Tutsi hate speech spread in the early 1990s and the ensuing violence that 
wracked the nation. 
Typically, free-speech advocates think of speech as arising from the individual heart or mind 
and overlook that speech is governed by social practices, most of which are quite local in their 
habitations. Thinking of speech in terms of one-off actions ignores the intensely social nature of 
language. We must see even these singular speech acts as arising within a pattern of practices, as 
gaining meaning from contexts and conventions, and so we must look at the conventions, 
contexts, and practices that the linguistic community sanctions. Doing so is especially important 
when language and social life no longer flow smoothly. In divided societies, different rules 
generate different meanings that depend on the speaker’s and the hearer’s social context, identity 
and affinity groups, and more. Aiming to overcome divisions requires taking a social practice 
view of discourse and looking at patterns of what we permit and what we prohibit. It requires 
taking charge of the range of permissible expressive commitments, our commitments to whole 
modes of discourse (such as using insect terms to talk about humans). Questions of the 
legitimacy of speech prohibitions often focus on the individual speaker or hearer and too often 
overlook the profound importance of the practices that give life to the expressions under review. 
Freedom of expression is widely touted as a basic human right, and yet most countries have 
restrictions on speech they deem harmful. Understanding the power of language to harm or to 
heal is best begun with an understanding of how language functions and why it matters. The first 
section briefly addresses these concerns. To understand Rwanda, and by extension to take 
lessons from their experience, we need an analysis of the normative damage wrought by 
genocide, and the potential of language, as our most ubiquitous social medium, to shape 
responses to these harms. The second section introduces two important philosophical concepts: 
recognition harms and expressive commitments. Understanding recognition harms highlights the 
many damages of harmful expressions. Focusing on expressive commitments keeps our attention 
on the social practices that make up language, not the one-off instances, and so helps to make 
sense of changes to speech policies. This section also makes some brief connections to cases of 
damaging speech beyond Rwanda.
1
 Drawing on these concepts, the third section shows how the 




Rwandan constitution and key provisions of the 2013 antidivisionism law address the damages 
of recognition harms by changing permissible expressive commitments, that is, by prohibiting 
speech that denies, minimizes, or otherwise fails to recognize the genocide and the experiences 
of those who suffered it. Finally, to make more concrete the kinds of speech acts that Rwanda’s 
leadership is trying to stop and the kind of discourse being promoted, the fourth section briefly 
discusses issues facing journalists, with a focus on an official handbook for journalists and 
writers, setting out some of Rwanda’s current rules for how to speak and write about the 
genocide of the Tutsi. Here, it is helpful to understand the different kinds of expressive 
commitments made by the suggested locutions compared with those that are critiqued. This 
handbook, available only inside Rwanda, offers valuable lessons about the role of discursive 
practices in postgenocidal recovery. In this section we also briefly consider advice from 
Zimbabwe that dovetails nicely with the Rwandan program. Ultimately, the argument is that 
where recognition harms are a significant factor in social and political life, changing permissible 
expressive commitments is crucial to social and political repair. 
 
Language Matters 
No society has absolute freedom of speech, and every society has its own norms governing 
appropriate and inappropriate modes of speaking. Together, our practices guiding how we refer 
to ourselves and each other wield power to shape our sense of who we are, who we can be, and 
what is possible between us. A shared language is, as Wittgenstein says, a form of life, which 
allows it to be, among other things, a mechanism of social stratification, a tool fostering attention 
or indifference, and sometimes a means for engendering violence.
2
 Sometimes our words are, as 
Victor Klemperer says, small “doses of arsenic,” unnoticed but toxic to their core.
3
 In a society 
that has become rigidly divided by race, religion, ethnicity, or gender, it sometimes becomes 
necessary to examine our discursive practices—our ways of speaking—to take control of the 
ideology implicit in those practices to unmake the damaging meaning. Too often, friends and 
foes of freedom of expression take their sides without an adequate understanding of the 
mechanisms and power of discursive practices. To be confident in deciding just how free speech 
should be, we must first understand language in practice. 
Expansive freedom of speech is an important part of an open and democratic society, but 
following war, genocide, and widespread social upheaval, security often calls for limits to free 
expression. As security improves, expressive freedom should expand, but postconflict societies 
must ask whether it should expand to the point that hate speech is tolerated. Germany says “no,” 
along with a dozen other European nations and Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
4
 Rwanda, 
still rebuilding from genocidal destruction, has come under fire for saying “no,” so it is worth 
examining their Law No. 84/2013 to see the scope of the prohibitions enacted by the Parliament 
after lengthy discussions. As Catharine MacKinnon says, “Social supremacy is made . . . through 
making meanings. To unmake it, these meanings and their technologies have to be unmade.”
5
 
Arguments about control over expressive freedom often mask grabs for power, so it is important 
to remember the historical and political context in which prohibitions are enacted or lifted, and 
the shifting dynamics of power at work. 
Taking control of speech can be done to cause harm, as the planners of the 1994 genocide of 
the Tutsi in Rwanda did by promoting derogatory terms against Tutsi, such as ‘inzoka’ (snake) 
and ‘inyenzi’ (cockroach), while promulgating hostile political speech acts designed to get Hutu 
to pull away from Tutsi so that they could kill them when the call came.
6
 Even without legal 
prohibitions, derogating a group with hate speech is a serious matter, especially when these 




speech acts become well integrated into ongoing discriminatory and social distancing practices.
7
 
Further, the most damaging linguistic practices are not usually the thrown epithets but rather 
third-party uses that target another, as in, “You and I both know that you can’t trust a so-and-so” 
(fill in the slur here). The FBI reports that the top three bases for hate crimes in the United States 
are race, sexual orientation, and religion. Since the 9/11 attacks in the United States, anti-Muslim 
slurs and images in the media have proliferated across the United States and Europe, and anti-
Muslim violence has more than quadrupled.
8
 Today, the slide between ‘Muslim’ and ‘terrorist’ is 
all too smooth, despite the evidence that most acts of terrorism in the United States and 
worldwide are not done by Muslims.
9
 Casting the wrongness of these modes of expression as 
insult or offense misses the key point that these practices constitute ideological, reputational, 
and, often, material harms. Habits of speech and terms of reference shape social life, licensing 
attitudes, and behaviors, enforcing social inclusion or exclusion, and sometimes licensing 
violence. 
Discursive changes can also be enacted to foster unity, dignity, and respect. In the United 
States, across several decades in the late twentieth century, African Americans, feminists, and 
gay rights activists set new norms of how one should speak about their groups. In 1920 ‘gay’ 
meant “cheerful,” but through adopting new norms within the subgroup and pushing for these to 
be adopted by everyone, ‘gay’ became an appropriate description for those who prefer partners 
of the same sex. Feminists fought against calling a grown woman ‘girl,’ introduced ‘Ms.,’ and 
were able to define certain kinds of speech acts as sexual harassment under the law. Among 
African Americans, the twentieth century saw a progression of positive self-chosen labels each 
chosen to promote greater dignity. In each situation, a derogated group reclaimed or replaced 
harmful terms, insisting on new labels; self-determination won out. 
Legislating changes in permissible speech practices is notoriously difficult. Changes to 
permissible speech usually occur gradually, driven by changes in other social norms and 
practices. Language never acts alone, for it gains power from its relation to other social practices 
and norms, and in turn strengthens and shapes these practices. Sometimes stopping or preventing 
harms requires directly changing the norms governing speech. These efforts aim to effect 
changes across a wide spectrum of social actions with a focus on the consequences of speech. 
Speech acts and modes of representation also may be harmful inherently, constituting wrongs 
against those targeted by the speech, independent of consequences. Recognizing these intrinsic 
and extrinsic concerns, postgenocide societies across Europe, especially Germany, enacted laws 
that prohibit and punish Nazi propaganda and anti-Semitic hate speech, with the intent to quell 
fascism. In rebuilding after state-sponsored genocide, Rwanda’s Parliament enacted a parallel 
law, Law No. 84/2013, to fight the divisions that support genocide. Such laws aim to foster 
greater internal security through lasting social change, thereby stopping injustice before it starts. 
Social distinctions are inevitable, but intractable social divisions are not. 
Discursive violence is violence. Many Rwandans who were there in 1994—survivors and 
killers alike—are keenly sensitive to the role of discursive practices in breaking down social 
relations and moral taboos, generating conditions enabling the genocide. Rwandans understand 
the power of language to shape social reality; as one Rwandan source says, “discourse has 
always borne within itself an ideology that seeks to convince or persuade or change the world.”
10
 
Since 1994, Rwanda’s efforts to prevent further violence include shaping a more inclusive public 
discourse through the formal mechanisms of law, education, and policy guidelines. Through 
reshaping the discourse about the genocide of the Tutsi and by prohibiting genocidal ideology, 
Rwandan leaders have been trying to build a stable and more just future. Promoting positive 




terms of reference for those who had been disparaged and dehumanized, promoting a shared 
historical narrative, and fighting genocide-denial is an ideological project, to be sure. It seeks to 
replace one ideology with another, so one key question is which promotes greater truth and 
greater inclusion. That is something for Rwandans to decide. Another important question 
concerns the processes by which these changes are enacted. The linguistic side of this project 
should be seen as arising from Rwandans’ awareness of the power language had in their own 
history, combined with a vision of a future shaped by more positive discursive norms. 
More than a thousand miles from the Land of a Thousand Hills, it is easy for Americans to 
look at Rwanda’s antidivisionism law as a harsh and unjustified set of restrictions on freedom of 
expression. American free speech law protects political speech, whereas in Rwanda, as in many 
European nations, political speech that promulgates racial or ethnic division is prohibited. 
Rwanda’s efforts to end divisionism must be understood within their complex and violent recent 
history, their colonial connections to Germany and Belgium, and their remarkable postgenocide 
development. Critics of Rwanda’s current limits on expressive freedoms tend to present the 
policies out of context and without any theory of the role of language in shaping a society and its 
members. These critics tend to focus enforcement issues, charging that the current administration 
uses the law to silence political opponents.
11
 Abuse of a law is not evidence that the law can do 
no good. The first version of the antidivisionism law (2008) was overly broad and offered more 
detail on penalties than outlines of offenses, so after discussions, Parliament revised it in 2013.
12
 
My concern is to understand what good the current law, Law No. 84/2013, is meant to do, or can 
do. These laws exist to fight the ongoing damage to a society still coping with rigid social 
divisions that were life threatening for some. 
Understanding Rwanda’s decisions might teach us something more general about the fraught 
but important nature of taking control of discursive norms to fight hate speech and derogatory 
images. Rwanda’s struggles are worth careful scrutiny for anyone seeking to understand the 
power of language in the construction (and reconstruction) of individual and social worlds. 
Rwanda’s situation should be seen as showing the validity of considering prohibitions and their 
value in particular cases. Whether, in the end, one praises or condemns specific policies should 
depend on an accurate understanding of language as a social practice and the context and 
rationale of the policies. This article is a contribution to understanding the background and 
rationale. 
 
Division and Domination: Language for Normative Repair 
Any understanding of genocide starts with an account of the mechanisms of dividing society into 
groups, establishing hierarchy, and then targeting one group for extermination. Understanding 
the role of division in Rwanda’s recent history offers important context for understanding their 
antidivisionism law. Division makes domination possible, and domination brings exploitation, 
which is usually so valuable to the dominators that it takes special conditions to target a 
dominated group for extermination. In Rwanda, those conditions emerged in the early 1990s. 
As far back as anyone knows, Rwanda has had three main groups of people living within its 
borders, the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa. These are commonly called “ethnic” groups, but only 
the Twa seem ethnically distinct, while the Hutu and Tutsi share the same foods, the same songs 
and dances, and the same religions, in short, the same culture. These are neither ethnicities nor 
tribes nor clans. For generations, ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ were status terms that applied to individuals, 
more class or guild terms than ethnicities. Anyone with ten cows would count as Tutsi, for as 
long as he or she had the cows.
13
 Among people who prized milk, the Tutsi gained esteem as 




herders, while the Hutu were farmers. Tutsi gained a different basis of value under Belgian 
colonial administration following World War I, during the height of Belgium’s infatuation with 
eugenics: measuring faces and heads led the Belgians to declare Tutsi to be more likely 
descended from Europeans and so more fit for social and political leadership. The distinction 
became more rigid in 1933 when the Belgians required Rwandans to mark their status as Hutu, 
Tutsi, or Twa on their national identity cards. These identity labels were words with tremendous 
power, opening doors for some, slamming them for others. During the genocide, this 
demarcation became a death sentence for Tutsi. Today, outsiders walking down the street in 
Nyamata or Ruhengeri (Musanze) will be hard pressed to tell who is Hutu and who is Tutsi, and 
yet most locals say they can quickly “see” the difference.
14
 The classification continues to matter 
to Rwandans, despite government efforts, because events since 1959, and especially 1994, make 
people want to know who is trustworthy, who is friend or foe. In a divided society, group identity 
spreads its tentacles all through social life. 
Jason Stanley argues that “group identities are the coral reefs of cognition; much of the 
beauty of the production of human intellect is due to their existence,” while also noting that 
“certain group identities are democratically problematic.”
 15
 If a group identity helps generate 
self-knowledge, on Stanley’s view, then democracy has a chance, but some group identities 
obscure our ability to recognize our own interests, for they “channel the rational flow of thought, 
and the affective flow of emotion in specific ways, creating obstacles to self-knowledge, as well 
as the free flow of deliberation required in a healthy democracy.” Group identities came to be 
problematic at least since the Hutu Revolution of 1959 when massacres sent Tutsi fleeing for 
their lives and eclipsed opportunities for remaining Tutsi for decades to come.
16
 When these 
group divisions were of little consequence, they would not have been a problem for developing 
democratic institutions. In the aftermath of a genocide that mobilized group identity and 
hierarchies of power, the continued salience of these terms became untenable. And yet, today, 
the terms themselves, the group labels, carry no sanctions. Nor could they, without obliterating 
access to Rwanda’s history. 
In 1994, Western media called the genocide the result of oppositional group identities run 
amok, a surge of unstoppable “ancient tribal hatreds.” For example, in April 1994, the New York 
Times reported that the death of President Juvenal Habyriamana “set off a centuries-old tribal 
hatred between the minority Tutsi ethnic group and the majority Hutus.”
17
 The death of 
Rwanda’s Hutu president was a catalyst for the start of the genocide of the Tutsi, but it was not 
its cause. From 1990 to 1994, the government worked to prepare Hutu men to be génocidaires.
18
 
Further, perpetrator testimony indicates that hate was not a real factor.
19
 Group identities were a 
tool in a genocide sponsored by state leaders with declining political power facing a troubled 
economy. Rwanda’s Hutu-power government was threatened by violent incursions from the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), an army of exiles (mostly from refugee camps in Uganda) 
seeking the long-denied right to return. As the president of Rwanda returned from signing the 
Arusha Accords, agreeing to significant concessions on power-sharing with the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF), his plane was downed and the genocide was unleashed. The RPA 
leadership was setting up offices in the Parliament building, which still shows the damage from 
mortar attacks inflicted by the sitting government. The genocide of the Tutsi was not a 
spontaneous upsurge in ancient tribal hatreds but a carefully planned means to consolidate 
political power and retain Hutu supremacy. 
MacKinnon’s observation that “social supremacy is made, inside and between people, 
through making meanings” reminds us to keep track of the ways that difference is used for 




dominance. Her next point applies to repair: “To unmake it, these meanings and their 
technologies have to be unmade.”
20
 Eliminating division closes one easy route to domination. 
For Rwanda, eliminating division has meant eliminating group identification on identity cards 
(1996), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of group membership for educational access or 
jobs, and promoting an ideology of national unity over group identities. Eliminating genocidal 
ideology is a key part of that project. Even with these changes, we must be wary of too much 
optimism. The damage done by years of divisions is deep and widespread, so the unmaking of 
divisive meanings is an arduous task. Their value serves the interests of some people, who will 
be loath to let go of them. 
 
Expressive Commitments: Eliminating the Arsenic 
When a society seeks to eliminate some ways of talking and introduce others, we should see this 
as engineering expressive commitments. The words we use and the ways we use them help to 
constitute the social, and sometimes material, world we inhabit. Whenever we speak, we not only 
undertake commitments in relation to the content of what we say (clarifying what we are 
referring to, justifying our claims, etc.) but we also undertake expressive commitments to the 
viability and value of the very words we are using, the modes of expression. If a professor calls 
her students “kids,” she is committing to the viability and value of using child-terms to refer to 
adult students. Many faculty avoid such locutions, to show respect. We tend to notice expressive 
commitments when we do not share them, and sometimes we challenge the terms others use 
because we are wary of letting the expressive commitments just hang there, lest they stay 
actively in play within the ongoing conversation.
21
 Commonly accepted expressive commitments 
are the scaffolding of our ways of speaking and thinking; they are elements of our shared 
ideology. 
When Thomas Kamilindi’s three-year-old daughter was called “snake,” she knew something 
was wrong about that. She felt the force of an ideology she did not share or understand. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Trial Chamber judgment explains: 
The Hutu Power movement, spearheaded by CDR, . . . promoted a Hutu mindset 
in which ethnic hatred was normalized as a political ideology. The division of 
Hutu and Tutsi entrenched fear and suspicion of the Tutsi and fabricated the 
perception that the Tutsi population had to be destroyed in order to safeguard the 
political gains that had been made by the Hutu majority.
 22
 
Speech acts were part and parcel of the genocidal repertoire. Unmaking the damage of these 
speech acts requires not just random one-off incidences of more speech but different discursive 
practices to take hold across the society. Expressive commitments need to change, as we see 
when derogatory terms such as inyenzi (cockroach) and inzoka (snake) are no longer acceptable 
for use against humans. In Rwanda, dehumanization is a violation of Law No. 84/2013, Article 
11, so these uses of these terms are forbidden. The law is saying, in effect, “We don’t talk that 
way anymore,” thus taking control of the expressive commitments and saying they are neither 
viable nor valuable. Law No. 84/2013 does not ban all division, however, for ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ 
are not banned words. These terms do not dehumanize or otherwise demean, but nevertheless, 
one must be careful in their use while practices concerning identity are in transition. 
The ICTR Trial Chamber judgment offers a mix of consequentialist and constitutive 
concerns: hate speech constitutes a harm in itself and it also spawns further harms: 




Hate speech is a discriminatory form of aggression that destroys the dignity of 
those in the group under attack. It creates a lesser status not only in the eyes of the 
group members themselves but also in the eyes of others who perceive and treat 
them as less than human. The denigration of persons on the basis of their ethnic 
identity or other group membership in and of itself, as well as in its other 
consequences, can be an irreversible harm.
23
 
The role of propaganda in the early 1990s and in 1994, particularly by the radio (RTLM) 
and newspapers (especially Kangura), has been well documented. Evidence was carefully 
reviewed by the ICTR, which found the leaders of these media outlets guilty of genocide 
(commission) as well as incitement. This finding was a milestone in legal acknowledgment of 
what hate speech is and does. The court found that the crime of persecution “is not a provocation 
to cause harm. It is itself the harm.”
24
 Some speech acts cause harms; some speech acts constitute 
harms. This gets messy, though, because those constitutive harms do usually lead to dire 
consequences. 
The position developing here is not only about words but about discursive practices and 
expressive commitments more broadly. Images matter too. The issue of permissible and 
appropriate expressive commitments also is not limited to Rwanda, though the dire results in 
Rwanda should serve as a warning. In Rwanda, the newspaper Kangura was full of derogatory 
cartoons about Tutsi, often focused on demeaning Tutsi women. These were easy to grasp, 
shocking, and ugly. The ICTR found the editor of Kangura guilty of genocide for the content he 
created and distributed. Anyone familiar with Kangura will see a parallel in the disrespectful and 
fear-mongering images in Charlie Hebdo, with its mockery of Mohammad and of Muslims in 
general. Charlie Hebdo editors said they were offering satire, but to what purpose? These images 
were about training people to disrespect a minority by mocking their prophet, while reinforcing a 
particular sense of French identity. One should hear echoes of Jean Paul Sartre’s searing charge 
that “if the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him” because the passion of the anti-
Semite is inherently self-directed, about claiming his place as a “true Frenchman.”
25
 The power 
differential between satirist and subject must also be taken into account. As Jacob Canfield 
argues, “White men punching down is not a recipe for good satire, and needs to be called out.”
26
 
Just as important, putting the imagery into the context of French Islamophobia, Serene Khader 
argues, makes what might seem to be religious slurs slide into racist derogations, designed to 
strengthen nationalism.
27
 Seeing derogations of Islam as part of a nationalist agenda helps to 
make sense of the double standard that allows slams against one minority religion (Islam) while 
punishing slurs against another (Judaism).
28
 It also makes sense of the enormous demonstrations 
in the streets of Paris. The editors of Charlie Hebdo did not deserve to be brutally murdered, and 
free speech is an important human right. How to balance expression against the many other 
human rights is a question each society must decide, and postconflict societies may have special 
reason for caution about speech and images. David Brooks oversimplifies when he says, 
“Healthy societies, in other words, don’t suppress speech, but they do grant different standing to 
different sorts of people.”
29
 One wonders whether there is an implicit circle here: if a society 
limits freedom of speech is that action ipso facto evidence of unhealthiness? 
A society’s laws embody the limits of its shared values in the form of restrictions that mark 
the boundaries of permissibility. Speech, as a kind of action, must fall within the scope of law. 
Many national constitutions include protections for speech, and internationally, the UN’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 




receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (Article 
19).
30
 It does not guarantee the right to persecute by what we say. In the United States, attempts 
to introduce speech codes on college campuses and within municipalities have generally failed in 
the face of the First Amendment and our intensely individualist focus.
31
 Nevertheless, such 
attempts should be seen as a glimmer of recognition that what one says counts as an action, and 
so should be (and sometimes is) actionable under the law. Such efforts should be seen as part of 




Language policy is a fraught concern because—of all the things we do—language feels so 
personal, what one says feels so intractably one’s own. A law or social policy limiting one’s free 
speech feels like a terrible intrusion of the public into the private. It fits well with a view of 
persons as autonomous agents, fundamentally independent of each other.
32
 Anglo-American 
liberalism is the standard bearer of this view. Speech protections protect individuals and their 
capacities for self-articulation and self-construction. Such protections are often very important 
for members of marginalized or oppressed groups whose speech would otherwise be silenced by 
what John Stuart Mill calls “the tyranny of the majority.”
33
 Addressing cultural imperialism, the 
feminist philosophers Maria Lugones and Vicky Spelman explain that “part of human life, 
human living, is talking about it, and we can be sure that being silenced in one’s own account of 
one’s life is a kind of amputation that signals oppression.”
34
 Speech restrictions rarely fall evenly 
across a society, and too often the weakest and most oppressed are also those most likely to 
suffer under restrictions. In contemporary Rwanda, the restrictions on the voices of genocidal 
ideology, most likely arising from a minority within the Hutu majority, are meant to protect 
survivors of 1994, who are seen as the most damaged and vulnerable members of society.  
If we shift the lens away from intense individualism and instead conceive language as 
inherently social, then a different evaluation emerges. A common language defines a social 
group and infuses the group with tools to articulate its shared life. It is a primary means by which 
mutual understandings come to be constructed and disclosed. Rather than seeing language as the 
private province of the individual, if we see it as shared first, then addressing the question of 
what we together want it to be gains traction. Explicit social attention to the norms of discursive 
practice is thus disclosed as just part of what a social group does. 
This social approach fits much better with many African philosophies and is particularly 
well expressed in the South African concept of ubuntu, which Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
describes as “My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.” Or, “A person is a 
person through other persons.” He adds, “It is not, ‘I think, therefore I am.’ It says rather: ‘I am 
human because I belong, I participate, I share.’”
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 A person requires the recognition of other 
persons to live within the group. This concept of the person as inherently social and 
interdependent is strongly held across rural Rwanda. Sylvie Umubyeyi, a survivor of the 
genocide of the Tutsi, explains: “In the customs of Rwanda, a neighbor is a most important 
person. Only your neighbor knows how you awakened, what you need, how to advise you, how 
we can help one another. If you no longer know your neighbors, or if they slip away when you 
talk to them, you feel a great loss, and you must leave.”
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 If your neighbor turns away, you lose 
your social home; this is a kind of normative abandonment.
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 Language is not the only way we 
interact, but it is a crucial medium of our social world, of our relation to ourselves and others. It 
constitutes our conceptual scheme. Repairing our discursive practices, how we speak with and 




about each other, is not sufficient for moral and social repair, but it surely is necessary. What we 
say has great power to offer or withhold recognition of the humanity of others. 
It is an understatement to say that the genocidal violence that wracked Rwanda left in its 
path survivors who were physically and psychologically damaged. The toll for those who died 
and the cost to families and communities is immeasurable. Material harms, such as rape, murder, 
mayhem, terrorism, and theft, do more than material damage. They also inflict recognition harms, 
because these crimes violate essential moral and social norms. Failing to respect the weight of 
the other person’s humanity, the perpetrator as it were declares it null, denying the victim moral 
and social recognition. Even after the physical wounds are healed, survivors struggle with “How 
could he have done this to me?” 
Genocide survivors are normatively damaged by a deep betrayal of shared humanity, often 
made possible by failures of due recognition. Think of Sylvie’s view about the importance of 
neighbors in Rwandan social world, as you consider this comment from convicted génocidaire 
Pio Mutungirehe, talking about the first time he killed: 
In truth, it came to me only afterward: I had taken the life of a neighbor. In that 
fatal instant I did not see in him what he had been before; I struck someone who 
was no longer either very close or strange to me, who wasn’t exactly ordinary 
anymore, I’m saying like the people you meet every day. His features were indeed 
similar to those of the person I knew, but nothing firmly reminded me that I had 
lived beside him for a long time. I am not sure you can truly understand me. I 
knew him by sight, without knowing him.
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Pio articulates the experience of recognition failure, a complex epistemic and moral failure. 
The identity of the other, someone quite familiar, did not mean anything to him, it carried no 
normative weight. This recognition failure is itself a harm, but it also results in a host of harms. 
When faced with grave harms such as murder, we lose sight of recognition harms, but we must 
see the role of recognition-failure in breaking down the murder taboo. For survivors, recognition 
harms linger, and only normative repair can help. 
The concept of normative damage traverses philosophy and the social sciences, the abstract 
and the concrete, the individual and the social. Communities are structures of norms binding 
individuals together; those norms are also woven through each individual. Expulsion from the 
community creates ruptures within the self, and expulsion of the individual usually also creates 
ruptures within the community. The individual feels the loss of community norms and the 
protections they provide, and the community tears the individuals from the social body, as if it 
prefers the wound to the whole that was. When expulsion is on the scale of genocide, the 
ruptures are vast. Survivors experienced normative expulsion from their community, and 
normative abandonment by those they trusted to keep them safe. Recognition harm is an 
important dimension of the myriad harms genocide inflicts. 
Genocide is not just a material or psychological crime; genocide gets its added intensity 
from being at its core a metaphysical crime. Genocidal intent presupposes a fixed ontology of 
kinds of persons, seeking their extinction, across all instances of the targeted kind, across time 
and place. From the perspective of those who survived being hunted, the apprehension that one is 
no longer welcome at home, or within one’s community, is not only painful but also leads to 
feelings of having been expelled from the normative frameworks of community. These feelings 
can arise in other contexts, such as among the Amish who shun those who leave to live in other 
communities, or among Orthodox Jews who sit Shiva when one of their children marries a 
Gentile. The child is as if dead. Shunning or sitting Shiva for the living is a form of normative 




expulsion. Genocide takes this expulsion much further, for survivors must face the apprehension 
that one is deemed no longer worthy of existence, and neither are one’s parents, children, 
siblings, or any kin. The metaphysical message that one is marked for extinction creates 
tremendous challenges for rebuilding the norms and practices necessary for community first 
among those who were marked and then between the marked and those who did the marking. 
To find salves for such normative damage, we seek acts of inclusion and recognition, 
through linguistic and material avenues for developing personal and social power. In rebuilding, 
Rwanda has sought to protect against internal ethnic division. Since the ethnic division was used 
to mobilize Hutu against Tutsi, weakening the grip of these category terms would be a start, but 
this is a tall order. Stopping the derogatory language and anti-Tutsi propaganda that fueled the 
violence would protect Tutsi survivors and fight the “Hutu mindset in which ethnic hatred was 
normalized as a political ideology” (ICTR). While political analysts may vary in their assessment 
of the root causes of the genocide, no one denies the power of anti-Tutsi propaganda in creating 
the interahamwe militias and preparing them to kill. Propaganda using derogatory terms for the 
targeted population, whether internal or external, is a standard process for turning citizens into 
killers.
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 It is useful during war but its divisive effects linger for decades in the ongoing uses of 
expressive commitments that inflict deep recognition harms. Ending hate speech is not enough. 
Many kinds of discursive practice must change, disallowing some expressive commitments. 
Everyday people in everyday contexts need to attend to the expressive implications of what they 
say. Legal sanctions and media policies may set a national agenda, but everyday practices are 
where the real change happens. 
Two cases have captured international attention recently, so we will take these up in the next 
section. Most recently, a 2014 BBC film, Rwanda’s Untold Story, has created an uproar among 
many Rwandans, especially genocide survivors, who see it as engaging in genocide denial.
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 The 
charges against this film help illustrate issues troubling Rwanda as it faces its recent history. 
Also relevant is the case against Victoire Ingabire, whose 2010 speech at Gisozi, Kigali’s 
national genocide memorial, resulted in her arrest. On the surface, much of her speech seems to 
call for unity and reconciliation, so we must look carefully to see how what she said runs afoul of 
the law. Our purpose in briefly considering these cases is simply to gain greater clarity about 
these kinds of problematic speech acts—divisionism, negationism, minimization, denial—to see 
what is at stake in the process of speaking one’s way out of a hostile, postgenocidal, divided 
society. 
 
Law No. 84/2013, Provisions and Tests 
The philosopher John Rawls, in his now classic 1971 Theory of Justice, asks us to imagine 
ourselves in “an original position of choice,” in which we must choose the basic principles of 
justice that would structure our society’s institutions. In the situation of those tasked to lead 
Rwanda in the aftermath of cataclysmic destruction wrought by its state-sponsored genocide, we 
see a real-life version of the Rawlsian original position. In those early days in late 1994, 
language policy would not be a high priority. All social, political, and economic infrastructures 
were destroyed. There were nearly a million dead, whose bodies must be found and buried with 
respect. The entire country was a crime scene. Survivors were physically damaged and deeply 
traumatized, while those who were part of the killing militias were either fleeing or hiding in 
plain sight, denying their participation. Distrust was (and remains) a survival mechanism in 
constant use, and ethnic identities were (and remain) highly charged. Building a new world from 
this wreckage required creating security, rebuilding institutions, getting people back to work, and 




healing damaged bodies and spirits. Ending ethnic division became a high priority, and language 
policies became part of that project. 
To ensure justice will emerge, on Rawls’s view, we must go behind a “veil of ignorance” 
that takes away our knowledge of our own position in society, as well as specific knowledge 
about others. In such ignorance, we would advocate for policies that raise life prospects across 
the whole society, and we would protect society’s least advantaged, since we may find ourselves 
in that position when the veil is lifted. Rawls argues that this approach—making sure that the 
system does not harm society’s least advantaged members—leads to maximizing the minimum 
welfare across society. In Rwanda, the least advantaged members of society are the Tutsi who 
survived being hunted and targeted for death, those who lost whole families, who were brutalized 
and left for dead and yet somehow survived.
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 Their presence is a constant reminder of horror, 
and even today, twenty years postgenocide, survivors remain a minority within the Tutsi 
minority, outnumbered by returnees. Keeping their plight in mind helps make sense of many 
provisions of the new Rwandan constitution and laws. 
The Preamble to the 2003 Rwandan Constitution opens with a statement about the genocide 
against the Tutsi, casting all that follows as a response. From its very inception, the new Rwanda 
took a stand against the genocide of the Tutsi as well as “any other form of divisions” (Clause 
2).
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 Preamble Clauses 3 and 4 set out responsive principles of democracy, unity, and 
reconciliation, and Clause 5 ties these to success in economic and social development. Later 
clauses stress the rule of law, based on “respect for fundamental human rights, pluralistic 
democracy, equitable power sharing” (Clause 6), and elements undergirding unity: “a common 
language, a common culture and a long shared history” (Clause 7), which are presented as the 
source of a shared vision for the future. Rwandans have always had a common language, 
Kinyarwanda, but for a while anti-Tutsi speech practices and demeaning images became 
common practice. New practices embracing unity are meant to crowd these out. These are ideals, 
born of the recent genocide, and not yet fully realized in the twenty years hence. This is no 
surprise; after all, the US Constitution also sets out beautiful ideals, not yet fully realized in the 
227 years since its ratification. 
The Constitution’s Article 9, which articulates Rwanda’s basic principles, sets the normative 
foundation for the language policy that emerged ten years later in Law No. 84/2013. Article 9 
repeats the national commitment to fight genocide ideology, specifically “the eradication of 
ethnic, regional and other divisions and the promotion of national unity,” also known as 
“antidivisionism.” If one is trying to eradicate ethnic divisions, then outlawing all uses of ethnic 
category terms would be an obvious move, but this is not what Law 84/2013 does. Rwanda really 
cannot outlaw ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ because they are a necessary component of the nation’s history, 
and they continue to have a strong grip on individual identities. In fact, Rwanda faces a Catch-
22: on one hand, treating everyone as “just Rwandans” may foster unity but obscures the legacy 
of the genocide, the responsibilities of perpetrators, and the losses of victims. It purports to 
overcome the victim/perpetrator framework, but clearly any such overcoming will be at the 
expense of the victims, who have already lost so much. On the other hand, special attention to 
the needs of survivors keeps alive the divisions heightened as part of preparing for and enacting 
the genocide. Unity comes at a price. 
 
A Demarcation Line 
Rwanda’s Law No. 84/2013 of November 9, 2013 “On the Crime of Genocide Ideology and 
Other Related Offences” is meant to comply with international standards and parallel European 






 In 2012, while the Parliament was debating revisions to the 2008 law, I met with one of 
the president’s legal advisers, who said that crimes against survivors dropped dramatically after 
the adoption of the 2008 law and expressed hope that the new law would “serve more as a 
demarcation line than a frequently used norm to regulate social behavior.” A demarcation line 
sets outer limits, and if these are respected, the norm will be enacting social change. If the social 
change is effective, then enforcement will be minimal because the new practices will not bump 
up against the prohibition. A more negative way to look at it is that the law will have a chilling 
effect; compliance is evidence only of the law’s effectiveness in controlling behavior. And, if 
enforcement gets too far ahead of social acceptance, resistance may mount. 
In defining the crime of genocide ideology, Article 3 requires the act to be deliberate, done 
in public, for the purpose of advocating for the commission of genocide or simply supporting 
genocide. Purpose and mens rea matter. Genocide based on race, ethnicity, religion, and 
nationality are all prohibited, and the speech act can be oral or written or by other means such as 
music or video. Similarly, Article 4 defines “incitement,” as a public act, done with the intention 
to “encourage, influence, induce or coerce” someone to commit genocide. Leon Mugesera’s now 
infamous 1992 anti-Tutsi rallying speech would count as incitement, but so would a radio 
announcer saying, “Kill the cockroaches in the red car approaching the roadblock.”
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What counts as “public” is narrower than one might expect: “a site in which acts are 
performed or words are uttered in the presence of or in a place accessible by at least more than 
two (2) persons” (Article 2, sec. 4). A speech at Gisozi counts as “in public,” but what if 
someone were to say the same thing to a table of friends while in a restaurant in Kigali? The 
restaurant setting meets the definition, and yet the privacy of a dinner conversation seems to fail 
the test of publicity. The publicity clause, until modified, needs special care in application. The 
two cases we are considering, the BBC film and Victoire Ingabire’s speech, are clearly public in 
any sense of that term. 
Earlier we said that discursive practices include images, such as political cartoons; Law 
84/2013 encompasses many forms of symbolic action, including material actions that have 
symbolic significance, including the destruction of evidence of genocide, destroying memorials, 
or damaging or stealing remains (Articles 8–10). Article 11, categorized as “Violence against a 
genocide survivor” involves a variety of deliberate but not necessarily public linguistic 
behaviors: 
Violence against a genocide survivor shall be a behaviour or any deliberate act 
that consists in harassing, intimidating, dehumanizing, ridiculing a person, 
boasting to his/her detriment, mocking, insulting him/her or destroying his/her 
property for the sole reason that he/she is a genocide survivor. 
Prohibiting dehumanization prohibits the use of inyenzi (cockroach) but not ‘Tutsi.’ Some 
cases are more subtle. Consider what is troublesome about: “You have long legs.” said to a tall, 
long-legged twenty-year-old man, on a bus, in Kigali, in 2004. This statement could well count 
as harassing and intimidating, for it invokes 1994 RTLM broadcasts, and the target of the 
comment was, indeed, a genocide survivor. This case would be impossible to prove, unless the 
speaker knew and was motivated by knowing that the target was a survivor; the action must be 
undertaken “for the sole reason that he/she is a genocide survivor.”
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 Most of our actions are 
undertaken for multiple reasons, so this is an escape clause. Surely the authorities are unlikely to 
reach onto that bus and charge the speaker with violating Law No. 84/2013, but the law’s 
existence still has a normative power to prohibit. 
 




Genocide Denial: Rwanda: The Untold Story 
Political dissent is not the problem with the BBC documentary Rwanda: The Untold Story (2014), 
which can be seen as a political and ideological attack on the Kagame administration’s 
legitimacy. The problem with the film is that it violates Law No. 84/2013 in several key ways. 
Under the law, genocide denial comes in several varieties: Negation (Article 5), Minimization 
(Article 6), and Justifying (Article 7). To understand the power of negationism and the challenge 
of distinguishing it from minimization, consider the incendiary claim made in the film by 
Professors Christian Davenport (University of Michigan) and Alan Stamm (University of 
Virginia). They claim that in 1994 there were “only 200,000 Tutsi killed,” because, they say, 
there were not enough Tutsi in Rwanda for the casualties to be as high as 800,000 to a million. 
This is an absurd claim and has been well rebutted.
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 By clearly underestimating Tutsi losses, 
this claim counts as minimization, that is, “downplaying the gravity or consequences of the 
genocide” (Article 6, sec. 1). Those making this claim further argue that if the death toll in 1994 
was between 800,000 and 1 million in 1994, the rest had to be Hutu, so this implies that the 
genocide might not have been a genocide, or it might have been a double genocide, since it 
argues that Hutu losses were greater than Tutsi. That argument meets Article 5: Negationism, 
section 2: misconstruing the facts to mislead, and section 3: supporting a double genocide. 
IBUKA, the umbrella organization for genocide survivors in Rwanda, issued a statement 
calling for the BBC to stop showing the film because of its inaccuracies. They focus on the 
political purposes of the film and charge its makers with denial: “It was with disbelief and 
disappointment that a few people who have their differences with the current government or the 
country were given a platform to politicise the Genocide and deny the planned and systematic 
killing of over one million people.”
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 The BBC also received a letter, signed by nearly forty 
scholars and respected experts on Rwanda, outlining the irresponsible claims made in the film. 
They state clearly that the film is a case of genocide denial, with dire consequences: “The 
programme has fuelled genocide denial. It has further emboldened the génocidaires, all their 
supporters and those who collaborate with them.” They also explain the importance of fighting 
genocide denial: “Denial, the final stage, ensures the crime continues. It incites new killing. It 
denies the dignity of the deceased and mocks those who survived. Denial of genocide is taken so 
seriously that in some European countries it is criminalized. In 2008 the Council of the European 
Union called upon states to criminalize genocide denial.”
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 Rwanda is not alone in fighting 
genocide denial, even as the forces of denial gather steam, especially from abroad. 
 
The Victoire Ingabire Case: Meaning Is Local 
The arrest and trial of Victoire Ingabire for her 2010 speech at Kigali’s Gisozi Memorial to the 
Genocide of the Tutsi included charges of terrorism and charges of genocide minimization. The 
Ingabire case illustrates the interplay between politics and speech, while a close examination of 
her speech and of where and when she spoke it shows the need for caution in rushing to 
judgment. Setting aside many important issues surrounding this case, including due process and 
Rwanda’s need for more political parties, analyzing the speech, in its context, shows why it 
raised concerns. Ingabire’s case has been used to argue that the current government in Rwanda is 
stifling political freedom; the charge may be well grounded by other cases, but international 
discussions of this case often rest on interpretive mistakes. 
Consider, for example, Tim Longman’s brief gloss on Ingabire’s case in the New York Times 
in June 2012: 




Ms. Ingabire, who had lived outside the country since before the genocide and is a 
member of the Hutu majority, stirred immediate controversy when she returned in 
2010 and spoke openly about ethnic politics—a taboo subject since the genocide. 
She was blocked from running for president. Several weeks after the election, 
which Mr. Kagame won with 93 percent of the vote, she was arrested for violating 
a 2008 law that prohibits “genocide ideology.” Ms. Ingabire had suggested that 
innocent majority Hutus who died during the genocide deserved to be mourned 
alongside the minority Tutsis who were massacred by Hutu militias. She has said 
her goal was reconciliation, not historical revisionism.
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Speaking about ethnic politics is not ipso facto engaging in ethnic politics, and Ingabire’s speech 
does the latter, which got her in trouble. Amnesty International similarly oversimplifies by 
simply citing “her political views” as the basis of the speech-related charges: 
The speech-related charges were brought against Victoire Ingabire following the 
public expression of her political views. The prosecution alleged that as leader of 
various political groups in the diaspora, and after her return to Rwanda in 2010, 
she had uttered, published, wrote or made known to the public through print, radio 




Ingabire’s case is not evidence that all political freedoms are at risk. Setting aside 
Longman’s argument by juxtaposition that suggests that the arrest altered the election results, 
which we do not know, there nevertheless may be justified concerns about varieties of political 
repression.
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 Some forms may be justified: just as Germany stifles the efforts to revive the Nazi 
party, so Rwanda stifles efforts to restore Hutu extremism in its many political forms. This action 
is a limited sort of political repression. 
We should focus on two of Longman’s key claims: first, that speaking openly about ethnic 
politics has been taboo since 1994, and second, that Ingabire’s urging that Hutu deaths in 1994 
should be mourned alongside Tutsi deaths is reconciliatory and not historical revisionism. The 
wrongness of these claims reveals how challenging it is to understand the depths of divisions that 
one does not live. Speech acts, even public speech acts, are local. They occur within a local 
context, a political climate, a moment in history, carrying the weight of the past. Speakers are as 
situated as are hearers. What a speech act is to outsiders might be very different from its meaning, 
impact, and power for locals. 
Locating the local is the challenge. Rwanda’s Media High Council’s Journalistic Handbook 
for Writing and Speaking about the Genocide discusses a report that fails to see the RTLM 
broadcast of “the grave is half full, who will help us fill it?” as a call to exterminate Tutsi.
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Their response is key: “RTLM journalists knew well before that however implicitly stated, the 
message once rendered in their mother tongue would be clear to the Rwandan audience in spite 
of some public or international opinions who might have an erroneous understanding of it.”
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 So 
let us be forewarned to look carefully at the local understandings. The report they criticize does 
remark that the discourse of RTLM “was far more subtle, and less direct, than most observers 
have acknowledged,” and yet it misses some of the subtlety just the same.
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When Victoire Ingabire went to Gisozi, the national genocide memorial in Rwanda’s capital 
city, Kigali, she brought flowers to place on the mass graves that hold over half a million brutally 
murdered Tutsi. This is a gesture of respect. The first half of Ingabire’s short speech explicitly 
supports remembering the genocide as genocide, and acknowledging the victims, survivors, and 




perpetrators as such. Ingabire makes clear that the speech is political, saying she represents a 
political party (the FDU) and adding that they endorse nonviolence and the message of “Never 
again.” She makes this point twice in only a few paragraphs (lines 9 and 14). A quick read will 
convince a casual observer that Ingabire was not denying, minimizing, or negating the genocide. 
Where Ingabire first runs afoul of the 2008 law is in saying, 
But then again, if you look around you realize that there is no real political policy 
to help Rwandans achieve reconciliation. For example, if we look at this 
memorial, it only stops at people who died during the Tutsi genocide. Hutus who 
lost their people are also sad and they think about their lost ones and wonder, 
“When will our dead ones be remembered?”
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Reading these words on a website a thousand miles away, it is easy to forget the context, but 
context is crucial. 
Place matters. Ingabire said this while standing in Gisozi, the national memorial to honor the 
victims of the genocide of the Tutsi. Consider a parallel: someone standing at the Berlin 
Holocaust Memorial, saying, “Germans of the Nazi Party are also sad about their loved ones who 
died, so why isn’t this monument also dedicated to them?” It is superficially compassionate but 
deeply horrific. The answer is clear: this monument honors the victims. Still, such monuments 
are, in an inverse way, also monuments to the perpetrators. At Gisozi, when you see the scope of 
the mass graves, you see the scope of the perpetrators’ actions. Remembering the losses reminds 
us that people did this and shows us what they did. It does not ask us to grieve for them, but we 
surely remember and rue their actions.
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Ingabire’s speech, on the surface, speaks of reconciliation and of justice for all. And yet, her 
mention of Hutu deaths makes no mention of Hutu responsibility for the genocidal murders of 
the Tutsi. Longman’s summary says: “Ms. Ingabire had suggested that innocent majority Hutus 
who died during the genocide deserved to be mourned alongside the minority Tutsis who were 
massacred by Hutu militias.” But, nowhere does she speak of “innocent majority Hutus.” She 
simply mentions Hutus who died. Even worse, the parallel construction in lines 21 and 22, 
suggests a moral and social parallel. 
A. “It is necessary that for the Tutsis who were killed, those Hutus who killed them 
understand that they need to be punished for it.”(Ingabire, line 21) 
B. “It is also necessary that for the Hutus who were killed, those people who killed 
them understand that they need to be punished for it too.” (Ingabire, line 22) 
Sentence (A) is uncontroversial, but (B) is ambiguous and troublesome. If she is talking 
about that the Hutu who were killed during the genocide because they refused to kill, or because 
they aided Tutsi, that is no problem under the law. These Hutu are generally referred to as 
“moderate Hutu” and counted within the ranks of victims. If she meant that the Hutu who were 
killed by the RPF in stopping the genocide are just as much victims as the Tutsi who they were 
killing, that is historical revisionism. Similar logic would require holding the Allied Force 
responsible for the Nazis they killed in defeating Hitler’s forces. It doesn’t make sense, because 
it turns perpetrators into victims, thus blurring the distinctions that fueled the genocide itself. 
This section does not argue that Ingabire should be tried for minimization or that the 
penalties are appropriate. A close analysis of the speech shows is that there is an elevation of all 
Hutu, not just the innocent Hutu as Longman suggests, promoting empathy for and 
memorialization of the killers. There should be concern within Rwanda for all its citizens now, 




whatever their past crimes, but this does not undermine the appropriateness of the Gisozi 
memorial or justify the denial of the heroic efforts of those who work with the National Unity 
and Reconciliation Commission, Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace, IBUKA, 
AVEGA, and more. 
The antigenocidal ideology law does not prohibit sadness, empathy, or grief. The law 
delimits which kinds of speech acts are acceptable and which ones are not. They are about shared 
practices, shared history, and rooting out ethnic division and hierarchy. These practices have 
power to shape our emotions and our everyday lives, because they come to constitute our ways 
of living. Recall Jason Stanley’s comment about group identities having the power to “channel 
the rational flow of thought, and the affective flow of emotion in specific ways.” In a society in 
which so-called ethnic identity is always salient, always stratified, always risky, to unlearn the 
divisions will take more than empathy for the sadness of others. It takes changing one’s very 
conceptual scheme. It takes learning to listen carefully and well, putting things said into context, 
and treading softly. 
 
“Listen to What You Say”: A Journalistic Handbook for Writing and 
Speaking about the Genocide 
The Rwandan journalist Thomas Kamilindi, whose little daughter was puzzled by “snake” 
applied to humans, tells a story about speaking to other journalists at a 2003 seminar in Côte 
d’Ivoire titled “Conflict, Peace and Media.” Kamilindi is describing his experience in Rwanda in 
1994. 
I said that certain reporters participated in the violence, while others spoke out 
against it. I reminded them that 48 journalists had been killed in Rwanda because 
they spoke out. The reporters in Côte d’Ivoire asked me, “How can we know if 
what we’re doing is wrong?” They didn’t know the answer to that question. Some 
of them had already gone too far. They had become part of the hate media without 
knowing it. So I told them, “look at what you write. Listen to what you say, and 
analyze yourself. If you are demonizing people, if you are stigmatizing other 
tribes, other clans, you’re involved in violence.”
57
 
Demonizing and stigmatizing are forms of violence. Kamilindi’s advice goes a long way to 
capturing the spirit of the guidance offered in the Media High Council’s Journalistic Handbook 
for Writing and Speaking about the Genocide. 
There’s an ethics to discourse as much as there is an ethics for any human activity. We do, 
often, make explicit our discursive norms—norms of what we can and cannot say, norms 
governing appropriate manner of speech, who should speak when, about what, why, and so on. 
Law No. 84/2013 is not the only way that Rwanda is trying to recast discursive practices to make 
them more inclusive, less damaging to survivors, and less likely to foment further genocide. As 
part of the effort to combat genocide denial and promote discursive accuracy, Rwanda’s Media 
High Council (MHC) commissioned research into the scope of genocide denial discourse and 
published a booklet to educate journalists and others about the issues. The handbook addresses 
the media, for the MHC holds that “the media determines the agenda of national concerns and 
imposes public priorities.”
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 In the United States, we call the media “the fourth estate” of 
government because a free press is essential to democracy. The MHC holds that guiding 
journalists can guide the nation. Public speech sets standards of acceptable practices, so in 
seeking to transition away from discourse heavily laden with genocidal ideology, the MHC set 




out to “examine the role of discourse in our daily communication.”
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 This handbook seeks to 
promote thoughtful engagement with the issues of how to speak with accuracy and respect about 
fraught and contested moments. Examining a few samples from this handbook highlights the 
differences in expressive commitments made by the suggested locutions compared with those 
that are criticized. Looking at their examples while keeping expressive commitments in mind, it 
is clear that this handbook seeks to undermine the viability and value of certain speech practices. 
Its purpose is more didactic than regulatory. 
Protecting survivors is central to the project of the handbook, for it includes many words and 
phrases that would, for example, trigger those traumatized, instill fear, or show contempt for 
victims, and in some instances it shows alternatives. The authors advise writers to “never use, in 
reporting, commentary, or headlines, disparaging words related to race, ethnicity, and so on.”
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Some words that come with warnings are not inherently ethnic or disparaging; the warning arises 
for the ways the words were co-opted by the Hutu extremists. Consider ‘umuganda’ (communal 
work). Today in Rwanda, on the last Saturday morning every month, called Umuganda Saturday, 
people all across Rwanda stop their personal activities to engage in community service. This is a 
long-standing Rwandan custom and participation is mandatory. In 2011, in Rwinkwavu, I saw 
groups of local people pulling weeds from the roadside ditches. There were clusters of people 
building or repairing houses together in the distance across the hillsides. Recent nationwide 
umuganda projects have included planting trees.
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 In 1994, RTLM radio broadcasts used 
‘umuganda’ as a code for killing, as if this were a community service. So now the MHC warns 
caution in the use of this term. We can see that this term is being reclaimed through the 
government reinstitution of Umuganda Saturdays, so this warning, while fair, should be taken to 
caution about the context of use, not to forbid all use. It has value, as tied to history and 
community building, but its viability is a question of scope. Umuganda-talk has a long way to go 
before it can be used in other contexts without prejudice. 
Since much of the language that prepared the killers relied on shifting the meanings of 
traditional proverbs, common metaphors, and euphemisms, the handbook urges journalists to 
develop a sensitive understanding of indirect discourse. These became important means of 
communication during the genocide as well. The guidebook warns not to trigger survivors by 
casual use of terms and phrases that were used to facilitate their trauma. A Rwandan friend, a 
survivor, told me a story about a traditional song she loved as a child.
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 The interahamwe took it 
up as an anthem, changing a few words, and in 1994 she would hear them on the streets singing 
it in cadence as they marched. The memory flooded back to her in alarm as we sat outside on a 
terrace above the street and heard a group of about twenty soldiers march rhythmically by. My 
friend explained that she always had loved the song, so she decided to reclaim it and sing it the 
old way with her children. One day, a friend heard her singing it and tried to shut her down. It 
was a trauma-trigger for her friend, even with the original traditional words restored, because the 
memory of the use by the militias was still too fresh. Reclamation of songs, proverbs, metaphors, 
and euphemisms associated with traumatic experiences is a difficult and very personal process, 
uneven in its results. 
The handbook urges journalists to say “jenoside yakorewe Abatutsi muri 1994” or more 
simply, “jenoside yakorewe Abatutsi.” Before setting foot in Rwanda, I tended to say, like so 
many others do, “the Rwandan genocide.” With local experience, I came to understand that 
survivors were unhappy with this locution, because Rwanda was not the target, the Tutsi were. 
So this common locution obscures the nature of the events. Instead, the more accurate (and 
cumbersome) phrase is “the genocide of the Tutsi” or “the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda.” 




This second option is a problem, though, because now génocidaires target Tutsi outside Rwanda 
in the diaspora too. 
Not all attentiveness leads to more cumbersome language. In Rwanda, I found that most of 
the people I spoke with just referred to the genocide as “’94,” as in “Where were you in ’94?” 
not “Where were you during the genocide?” Someone might say, for example, “In ‘94, I fled 
from Kigali to Kibuye.” This statement is similar to Americans referring to the attacks on the 
World Trade Towers and Pentagon as “9/11.” It is a shorthand that everyone understands, and it 
does not put the whole concept right in your mind’s eye with every utterance. The point is not to 
erase but to soften the way of referring in order not to retraumatize. This balancing act, 
suspended between accuracy and delicacy, is a constant issue in Rwanda, so guidelines like the 
handbook and advice like Thomas Kamilindi’s are invaluable. 
Most discussions of good journalistic practice will rule out promoting hate speech, 
incitement, and other forms of damaging discourse. For example, the Zimbabwe Peace Project 
(ZPP), expressing concern that “hateful words can all too easily lead to physical attacks on 
citizens and set off a cycle of violence” calls for an end to hate speech. Further, the ZPP calls for 
the Zimbabwe Media Commission “to promote and enforce good practices and ethics in the 
media, and to monitor broadcasting in the public interest” while ensuring a diversity of 
viewpoints. In their defense, they cite Guatemala, Bosnia, and Rwanda as examples of genocidal 
violence fueled by hate speech. The challenge, as they note, is to balance diverse voices, foster 
political inclusion, and still restrict incendiary or inherently harmful speech practices.
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 Similarly, 
the Ethical Journalism Network, an international organization founded in 2011, argues that 
journalism would improve if journalists considered their sources carefully (who is speaking), 
looked for the patterns and scope of what is said, noted its reach and objectives, and kept track of 
the economic, social, and political context.
64
 They urge journalists to “combine free expression 
with a commitment to professional and ethical standards.” Not every citizen is a journalist, of 
course, but in the project of guiding expressive changes to promote greater recognition across a 
society, cautions for journalists are always worth considering for the examples they set. 
 
Conclusion 
In general, protecting freedom of expression contributes to individual welfare and the common 
good. The development and protection of a free press is crucial to democracy. The classic source 
of these views is John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, which argues that free speech promotes access to 
more information and better sources of information and so is the fuel of democratic decision 
making. Censorship and silencing harm society by closing down what could become valuable 
alternatives, and even for those views that are utterly wrong, Mill sees their wrongness as 
instructive and argues that the views are valuable as a foil. He classifies such views as “more-
speech” views, arguing that the cure for bad speech is more speech. This position requires 
considerable confidence in social and political security, offering an ideal to achieve, which may 
not be immediately possible in the aftermath of atrocities like genocide. Further, such views do 
not take adequate account of the power dynamics of whose speech matters, whose speech carries 
more weight in the social and political arena. Nevertheless, careful attention to rebuilding 
discursive practices can go a long way to fostering the inclusiveness and trust that will make 
such freedoms possible. 
There is much to learn from Rwanda’s efforts, through law, government agencies, and 
informal mechanisms, to take control of the expressive commitments of what people say. It is not 
clear that the engineering of discourse can always succeed, but if all language has an implicit 




ideology, and if Klemperer is right that words can be like arsenic, easy enough to take in bit by 
bit but ultimately toxic, it is worth trying to change the diet. Rwanda’s antidivisionism efforts are 
a work in progress, seeking to replace damaging discursive practices with practices that show 
respect. Denial and negationism are the final phase of genocide, and Rwanda is facing that now. 
In time, with widespread discursive change and education reform, they may not need laws like 
84/2013 or handbooks of discursive advice. But explicit avowals of national unity and 
reconciliation may remain important even after damaging divisions are no longer active. 
Simply saying, “Let’s change how we talk” is never going to do the whole job of ending 
discursive violence. Consider Peter Teachout’s optimistic analysis of the situation in Germany, 
to see the variety of efforts needed to fight the power of lingering Nazi ideology. 
An equally if not more important change since the end of World War II has been 
the emergence of effective alternative methods for combating ignorance and 
misinformation about the Holocaust. Education in public schools, Holocaust 
memorials and museums, official days of remembrance, documentaries and 
popular films, and, perhaps most importantly, websites like Nizkor, have 
profoundly altered the informational landscape. These developments undermine 
the need to rely on criminal prosecutions to combat negationist statements since, 
with the wealth of accurate information now readily available, the likelihood that 
such statements will be taken seriously is greatly diminished. Negationist claims 
are much more likely to ring false and suspect to an educated public. Moreover, 
there is now full and adequate opportunity for rebuttal.
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Teachout places great faith in the power of education, but even if negationism were to lose 
traction, it would still be worth making an explicit stand against it. What is helpful here is 
Teachout’s list of types of commemorative actions and integrations that help to fight denial. 
Rwanda is doing all of this, but it is still early days. Appropriate changes to discursive practices 
can lead the way to greater freedoms. Even Rwandans who accept the entire antidivisionist 
rationale should still seek greater expressive freedoms in a wide variety of venues. Rwanda still 
needs a full and free press, more outlets than currently exist, and encouragement of a diversity of 
views.
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 Rwanda can fulfill these needs while still fighting ethnic divisions. 
Current criticisms of Rwanda show impatience. Twenty years is a long time to outsiders, but 
not so long to those doing the hard work of rebuilding a nation. In evaluating policies like Law 
84/2013, we also should look at whether policies are interim or meant to be longstanding. Strict 
repression as a response to the collapse of the state, with the chaotic and dangerous social 
aftermath, makes sense as part of a return to a more secure situation in which such repression 
loses its justification. If one accepts this rationale, the question then arises: How long should 
such restrictions stand? As long as they express the society’s commitment to fight division. And, 
as long as lingering recognition harms shape opportunities for social, civic, and political 
engagement. Today, more than a dozen European nations have laws against the display of Nazi 
images, the sale of Hitler’s Mein Kampf, and the promotion of Nazi ideology and anti-Semitism. 
Despite broad freedoms, these nations have drawn a line in the sand. Germany still has its anti-
Nazi speech laws, nearly seventy years since the end of World War II. Human Rights Watch 
started to attack Rwanda’s policies after only twelve years.
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 They may be right to condemn 
particular uses or abuses of the policies, but we must look at these policies separately from their 
enforcement, and see what positive normative force they can offer. A society freeing itself from 
deep immersion in genocidal ideology must undertake a thoughtful and deliberate extrication that 
includes changing permissible expressive practices. This action is crucial for creating a context 




in which individual freedoms can emerge, in which the least advantaged members of society—
those who were targets—are protected, and in which fear and distrust can be set aside. 
Avoiding discursive violence can be achieved by keeping track of our expressive 
commitments and resisting recognition harms. Let us listen to Thomas Kamilindi: Let’s listen to 
and analyze what we say and make changes accordingly. Outside Rwanda, we must look at the 
social divisions that drive our societies, see how they promote division, domination and 
exploitation, and make sure that these divisions do not rationalize additional forms of violence. 
In the United States and Europe, race and religion are intertwined in identity politics, so we must 
be especially wary of facile language and damaging images that divide us across these lines. 
Sensitivity to our habits of categorizing ourselves and others, and changing behaviors 
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